Fixing the Homeland Security Advisory System

It would hard to argue against changing the Department of Homeland Security's The Homeland Security Advisory System alert system. It may have served its purpose in the past, but now's the time to fix it. It's not that the threats no longer exist, thus no alerting system is needed. Threats clearly exist, both natural and man-made. It's that the color-coded alert system is too blasted difficult to use.

Most significantly, it's not addressable. Threats are generally local and regional. They often affect a sector. When we talked recently (see post) with Mike Byrne, the man Tom Ridge credited in his book "The Test of Our Times", with coming up with the idea for the color-coded alert system, he told us that the original concept was for the system to be "sector specific with more geographic impact". Although DHS has, from time to time, adjusted the alert level for a sector, the system can only very awkwardly and perhaps ineffectively be adjusted.

The challenge is not a technological one. A hodgepodge of technology is available that would allow DHS to target geography and sectors; some of the necessary technology is already in place. The challenge is more one of data management and coordination.

Let's say DHS wanted to change the alert status for communities in Georgia near military bases. They could announce the change through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), which provides secure access to many public safety agencies. Authorized personnel from the agencies simply log-on to see what's going on that could affect them. If necessary, they can take action. A pretty good system, I say, in the normal course of events. Yet, a need to change the alert system does not occur in the normal course of events. Something significant and time sensitive has occurred.

Here's where the break-down occurs: Let's say Macon, Georgia, a few miles from Robins Air Force Base (RAFB) has resources checking HSIN regularly. They'll see the alert status change, and supporting information that allows them to take action. But, what about Cochran, Georgia, another few miles from RAFB, a much smaller community? They may not be checking HSIN regularly. (Not picking on Cochran. I just know the area because I grew up there.)

So, how do you get the word to Cochran that something important is happening and they need to check HSIN? That's where the data management and coordination come into play. A process could be established through which all communities have a designated person(s) responsible for receiving a telephone call and/or other communications 24/7 that would simply alert them to check HSIN. No need to pass along secure or detailed information in a quick phone call (with confirmation required). They would simply be alerted that HSIN holds important information for them, including a change in the alert level. That person would know what process and procedure to follow in the community to respond to whatever had been passed along.

Perhaps the notification comes from DHS to the state emergency management agency. The state EMA would know which communities are most likely to be affected.

A rather tall order designating someone in every community to be responsible for receiving the tap on the shoulder, you may say. Perhaps, but with federal funding supporting such a program, it could be done quite effectively and efficiently. Thoughts?

All the best,
Rick